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Skeptical Challenges to International Law 
 
 
 
 
International law differs in many respects from the legal system of a well-functioning 
modern state. The rules of international law do not come from a global legislature but from 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, and from customary rules that crystalize evolving state 
practice. State consent plays a fundamental role in shaping and legitimizing international law.  
Even the International Criminal Court, whose  jurisdiction involves crimes of the greatest 
concern to the international community, such as crimes of aggression and crimes against 
humanity, still largely depends on states’ voluntary submission to its authority. Finally, with the 
rare exception of uses of force or economic sanctions authorized by the United Nations Security 
Council, enforcement in international law largely takes the form of self-help.    
 These differences have invited a number of skeptical challenges to international law, 
three of which we explore in this essay. The first points to one or more of the deviations of 
international law’s institutional structure from that of a modern state’s legal system as a basis for 
denying that international law is really ‘law.’ Central to the debates over international law’s 
status as law are concerns about whether and why the concepts of law inherited from domestic 
legal systems should serve as the blueprint for theorizing law in general, and international law in 
particular.  
The second skeptical challenge targets international law’s legitimacy. What reason(s) do 
actors have for treating international legal norms, or the exercise of political power by 
international institutions, as anything other than an attempt by states to advance their national 
interests, or perhaps the interests of powerful non-state actors such as multi-national 
corporations? Why think actors have any moral duty to respect or obey international law or legal 
institutions, as opposed to merely prudential reasons to do so?  Following a brief description of 
recent debates over how we ought to understand the concept of legitimacy when used to assess 
international political practices or global governance, we survey several possible bases for a 
moral duty to obey or respect international law. These include state consent, the service 
conception of legitimate authority, and global democracy.     
The third set of challenges focuses on the relationship between state sovereignty and 
international law. In Germany v Italy, the International Court of Justice required Italy to make 
changes in its domestic legislation or to take measures with the same effect to accommodate the 
decision by the court to uphold Germany’s sovereign immunity.1 This is a clear example of an 
international institution making demands for reform affecting the domestic law of a state in order 
to elicit compliance with international law. Are there limits to what international law can require 
of states? What are the boundaries of states’ prerogatives to make their own rules? Should those 
boundaries be defined by general international rules or are they a matter of purely internal 
exercises of democratic self-creation? Skeptics argue that the rule of international law is 
incompatible with states’ political self-determination. Regardless of whether their defense of this 
claim ultimately succeeds, thoughtful engagement with it may well require us to rethink some of 
                                                     
1 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) 2012. 
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the fundamental concepts and normative ideals in political philosophy, including state 
sovereignty, democracy, individual rights, political authority, and political obligation.2 
 
SECTION 1: Is International Law Really Law? 
 
Many contemporary scholars give short shrift to the question of whether international law 
is really law.  Some, like the prominent international legal theorist Thomas Franck, assert that we 
now live in a “post-ontological” era, where the existence of a genuinely legal international order 
can be safely presumed, and theorists can focus instead on investigating whether international 
law is effective, enforceable, understood, or fair (Franck, 1998, p. 6).  Others suggest that it 
makes no difference whether international law is really law, since we can still ask whether the 
norms, practices, and institutions commonly but perhaps inaccurately referred to as international 
law are fair, legitimate, or just (Buchanan and Golove, 2002, p. 878).  These responses treat the 
question “is international law really law?” as a theoretical one, a matter of the category in which 
we ought to place international law when we offer a description of the universe.  Admittedly, 
certain treatments the concept of law, and the question whether international law is really law, 
invite such a reading.  Nevertheless, we maintain that this mischaracterizes international legal 
skepticism.  Typically, those who question whether international law is really law, or better yet, 
who assert that it is not, do so as part of a practical argument, one intended to support a particular 
conclusion regarding what some agent, such as a state (official), should or should not do.  Put 
another way, implicit in the skeptical challenge to international law is an assumption that law 
makes, or at least is capable of making, a distinctive contribution to human deliberation, and so 
to the production of social order.  When a person argues that international law is not really law, 
she implies that international law does not, and perhaps cannot, matter in the way that law 
matters (Hathaway and Shapiro, 2011, pp. 255-6).  Ironically, then, in investigating whether 
international law is effective, enforceable (or enforced), understood (or determinate), or fair, 
Franck actually directly addresses many international legal skeptics, who maintain that 
international law lacks one or more of these properties and argue (or assume) that possessing 
them is necessary and/or sufficient for the existence of genuine law (Kleinfeld, 2010; Lefkowitz, 
unpublished manuscript). 
The question of whether international law is law was raised most incisively in the 19th 
century by the legal philosopher John Austin, who famously maintained that it was not. On 
Austin’s account, law exists as the command of the sovereign, where commands are understood 
as orders backed by the threat of coercive sanctions in the event of non-compliance (Austin 2012, 
36). A sovereign is someone who is habitually obeyed by others but does not habitually obey 
anyone else. Since international law does not possess a sovereign that issues commands, Austin 
concludes that it does not qualify as law (2012, 188-89, 231-32).  
Austin’s ‘command theory’ of law has been repeatedly challenged, though it remains the 
intuitive approach of most of those who are new to the study of international law. But some 
corners of the scholarly profession also hold on to this view. Realist international relations 
                                                     
2 In this brief article we focus almost exclusively on arguments advanced by legal and political 
philosophers working in what might be called the Anglo-Saxon analytical tradition.  We strongly 
encourage readers interested in the topics discussed in this essay, or in the philosophy of 
international law more generally, to explore the many schools of thought in the field of 
international legal theory (for an overview, see Orford et al., 2016; Bianchi, 2016). 
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scholars take the lack of centralized enforcement, the fragmentation of international treaty 
regimes, and the (alleged) fact that states are only bound by international law with their consent 
as proof that international law does not constrain states in the manner that genuine law must. 
These skeptics view international law as at best a policy tool to advance the interests of powerful 
states and at worst as a form of cheap talk that encourages little change in behavior and even less 
cooperation among nations. We develop this point below.  In the most recent iteration in the long 
running debate over the conceptual connection between law and coercive enforcement, Oona 
Hathaway and Scott Shapiro (2011) respond that Austin-style critiques of international law’s 
status as law rest on an excessively narrow conception of law enforcement, one that conflates it 
with the distinctive mode of law enforcement realized in a modern state. 
In his brief discussion of international law, H.L.A. Hart (2012) attempts to dispel certain 
mischaracterizations of international law that flow from what he maintains are bad legal theories.  
Foremost among these is Austin’s claim that international law is not really law, but only positive 
morality.  Hart maintains that the failure of the command theory to accurately describe municipal 
legal orders, which he assumes are paradigmatic examples of law, provides a compelling reason 
to reject it as an analysis of international law as well (Hart, 2012, pp. 216-32).  Therefore, the 
fact that international law does not satisfy the command theory’s criteria for law does not 
warrant international legal skepticism.  Hart also criticizes certain defenders of international 
law’s status as genuine law, however.  He argues that attempts to identify international legal 
analogs to the practices of legislation, compulsory adjudication, and centrally organized 
sanctions present in a municipal legal system rest on a mistaken assumption that such institutions 
are necessary for the existence of a genuine legal order (Hart, 2012, pp. 232-3). Hart also rejects 
Kelsen’s claim that international law must possess a basic norm, in virtue of which discrete 
international legal norms constitute a system of law.3  Rather, international law comprises only a 
set of rules, and those rules count as law simply because states accept them as such, not because 
they have been enacted in accordance with some more basic norm (Hart, 2012, pp. 233-7). 
Hart provides as an alternative theory of the nature of law and consequently a different 
answer to the question of whether international law is law. On Hart’s theory, a legal system must 
meet two minimal conditions: the primary rules of obligations are obeyed by most of the law’s 
subjects, and the secondary rules that explain how primary rules are made, changed, and 
interpreted are generally accepted by public officials (Hart 2012, 116). The rule of recognition is 
a special kind of secondary rule that plays a fundamental role in Hart’s theory, as the rule that 
explains the validity of all other rules within the system. It is usually unstated but it is assumed in 
the way public officials deploy it to identify other secondary rules and all of the primary rules of 
the legal system. For example, Hart describes the rule of recognition in England as ‘whatever the 
Queen in Parliament enacts as law is law’ (Hart 2012, 102). 
Hart argues that international law lacks a rule of recognition, and therefore lacks the 
status of a legal system. Unlike domestic law, international law is merely a set of primary rules 
of obligations that are not united by secondary rules (Hart 2012, 214). There is some debate 
about whether Hart was correct in his assessment of international law. Criticisms of Hart’s 
treatment of international law fall into two categories: those that broadly accept Hart’s analysis 
of law but maintain that he misapplied it when describing international law, and those that point 
                                                     
3 For reasons of space, we do not discuss Kelsen’s (philosophical) treatment of international law, 
or the work of contemporary Kelsenian international legal theorists.  Both merit attention, 
however; see, e.g., Kelsen 1967; von Bernstorff 2010; Kammerhofer 2011.  
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to shortcomings in Hart’s account of international law as evidence of deficiencies in his 
characterization of law.  The former typically challenge Hart’s description of international law as 
akin to a simple, or primitive, social structure, one consisting only of primary rules of obligation, 
and/or his claim that international law lacks a rule of recognition (Waldron, 2013; Payandeh, 
2011; Pavel 2018).  Yet if we look past a certain sloppiness in the presentation of his argument, it 
is possible to construct a sympathetic reading of Hart’s take on international law, one that trades 
on the distinction between a hierarchy of norms – present in international law – and a hierarchy 
of agents, which international law largely does without (Lefkowitz, 2017; Nardin, 1983). This 
latter feature explains why international law’s capacity to contribute to the production of social 
order differs from, e.g., that of a moderately well-functioning modern state’s domestic legal 
order, with important implications for its utility as a means for realizing justice (Hart 2012, p. 
220).  Among those who advance the latter type of critique, some maintain that the challenge of 
identifying international legal officials offers a compelling reason to reject Hart’s analysis of law 
and a legal system, which they maintain ties those concepts too closely to the concept of the state 
(Culver and Guidice, 2010; Collins, 2016).   
Not surprisingly, Ronald Dworkin also finds fault with Hart’s analysis of international 
law, and more generally, with a legal positivist approach to addressing the skeptical challenge to 
its status as genuine law. Dworkin quickly dismisses Hart’s discussion of international law on 
the grounds that it addresses a classificatory dispute of little practical import (Dworkin, 2013, pp. 
4-5).  The far more important question – for legal officials, subjects, and philosophers – is a 
practical one, namely “how should we identify what the law is?”  To answer that question, we 
need an account of the grounds of law; e.g. an account of what makes it the case that a given 
actor possesses, or does not possess, a legal right.  Orthodox international legal positivists 
identify state consent as the property that confers legal validity on a rule or standard, but 
Dworkin offers a number of reasons to think such a view mistaken (Dworkin, 2013, pp. 6-10).  
For example, it fails to account for (or distorts) the process of customary international law 
creation, as well as the nature of jus cogens norms, i.e. international legal norms from which 
states may not derogate. Dworkin is hardly the first to advance these objections, and more 
sophisticated positivist accounts of international law, which do not limit the social facts that 
make law to state consent, may avoid many of them.  However, they too may be vulnerable to 
Dworkin’s argument that a legal positivist account of international law offers insufficient 
guidance on how to interpret international legal materials such as the U.N. Charter.   
Suppose international law consists of the rules to which states have agreed; few deny this 
is true for much of international law, even if not for all of it.  Dworkin's view is that where there 
is no consensus on the meaning of the law, there is no law. What follows for international law is 
that there is no law where there is no consensus regarding the meaning of a treaty provision, or 
the content of a customary international norm. Rather, in such cases international legal actors 
enjoy discretion, the freedom to act as they think morally best.  Dworkin suggests this sort of 
indeterminacy, where the content of international law cannot be determined by a shared 
understanding among states (and other international actors, such as judges on the International 
Court of Justice) is quite common.  If true, the exceedingly large number of “gaps” in 
international law brings us quite close to the skeptical conclusion that there is no international 
law.  In order to defend the reality of international law, he concludes, we must abandon legal 
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positivism and instead embrace an interpretivist account of law as a semi-structured, moralized, 
practice of argumentation (Dworkin, 2013, pp. 10-13).4 
 For Dworkin, a finding of law is an answer to a specific moral question, namely which 
political rights and obligations may a given political community’s coercive institutions enforce 
on demand, i.e. without the need for any further collective political decision? (Dworkin, 2013, p. 
12). Specific conclusions, e.g. regarding the legality of unilateral humanitarian intervention, are 
the product of a constructive interpretation of international legal materials in light of the moral 
purpose we ought to attribute to the practice of global coercive rule.  That purpose, Dworkin 
contends, is to diminish the dangers the Westphalian conception of state sovereignty poses to 
basic human rights (Dworkin, 2013, pp. 16-19).  These include domestic campaigns of crimes 
against humanity or genocide, international aggression, failures of international cooperation that 
result in environmental, economic, or health catastrophes, and cross-border domination.  This 
duty to mitigate “the failures and risks of the sovereign-state system… provides the most general 
structural principle and interpretive background of international law” (Dworkin, 2013, p. 19).  
An attempt to identify specific international legal norms solely by appeal to this duty may fail to 
yield a determinate answer, however.  Therefore, Dworkin identifies a second “fundamental 
structural principle” that ought to inform our constructive interpretation of the practice of global 
coercive rule.  This principle of salience states: “if a significant number of states, encompassing 
a significant population, has developed an agreed code of practice, either by treaty or by other 
form of coordination, then other states have at least a prima facie duty to subscribe to that 
practice as well, with the important proviso that this duty holds only if a more general practice to 
that effect, expanded in that way, would improve the legitimacy of the subscribing state and the 
international order as a whole” (Dworkin, 2013, p. 19).  On one reading, the principle of salience 
indicates a way in which backward-looking considerations of fit with past practice and doctrine 
ought to figure in the identification of international law.  Yet Dworkin contends that due to its 
relative youth as a genuine legal order – a status he maintains it acquired only with the signing of 
the UN Charter in 1945 – appeals to political morality, such as the duty of mitigation, may well 
figure more prominently and regularly in the identification of international legal norms than is 
true of more mature legal orders (Dworkin, 2013, pp. 29-30). 
 Though only recently published, Dworkin’s philosophy of international law has already 
attracted criticism.  Thomas Christiano (2016), for example, maintains that Dworkin errs in 
identifying states’ enhancement of their own, domestic, legitimacy, as the fundamental moral 
aim of international law, while also arguing that attributing such a purpose to international law 
does not warrant many of the conclusions that Dworkin draws. Adam Chilton (2013) contends 
that were international officials to adopt Dworkin’s approach to identifying the law, states would 
be unwilling to sign up to treaties that could be interpreted in ways that would restrict their 
sovereignty, leading to an overall diminishment in international law’s contribution to the goal of 
                                                     
4 Among international legal theorists, the most influential proponents of the claim that 
international legal norms are indeterminate are Martti Koskenniemi (1989; 1990) and David 
Kennedy (1988).  Neither would endorse Dworkin’s account of how to proceed in the face of 
such indeterminacy, though the former’s tentative endorsement of “constitutionalism as a 
mindset” (2007) is reminiscent of Dworkin’s concluding characterization of law in Law’s Empire 
as “a protestant attitude that makes each citizen [but especially lawyers and judges] responsible 
for imagining what his society’s public commitments to principle are, and what these 
commitments require in new circumstances” (Dworkin 1986, p. 413). 
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advancing respect for basic human rights.  Finally, Lefkowitz (unpublished manuscript) argues 
that given his general philosophy of law, Dworkin ought to have embraced international legal 
skepticism, and drawn on his account of how judges in a wicked legal system ought to exercise 
the powers attached to their offices to offer guidance to international officials. 
 
  
SECTION 2: The Legitimacy of International Law 
 
 Philosophical investigations of international law’s legitimacy focus on two questions.  
First, how ought we to understand the concept of ‘legitimacy’ as applied to international law and 
international institutions?  Second, whatever the nature of legitimate rule, what conditions must 
an international legal norm or agent satisfy in order to be legitimate?   
 
Concept of Legitimacy  
On one common understanding, when we ascribe legitimacy to those who govern, or 
describe their conduct (e.g. legislating) as legitimate, we maintain that they enjoy a right to rule.  
Many legal and political philosophers characterize the right to rule as a claim to practical 
authority; roughly, as a right to determine what subjects may, must, or must not do, to which 
correlates a duty of obedience on the part of subjects. Others characterize the right to rule as a 
protected liberty to make, apply, and – especially – enforce the law.  While subjects have no duty 
to obey the law on this understanding of the right to rule, they do have a duty not to interfere 
with any exercise of government that falls within the scope of the right. 
Reflection on the legitimacy of international law and institutions has led some theorists to 
argue for the adoption of a broader characterization of legitimacy, one that does not draw a 
conceptual connection between political legitimacy and a right to rule (however understood) 
(Buchanan 2013; Held and Maffettone, 2016).  The existing international political order contains 
a variety of actors, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Human Rights 
Committee (which monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, who make no claim to practical 
authority, nor to being justified in the use of force. Yet these actors, and their conduct, are 
nevertheless appropriate targets of legitimacy assessments.  Therefore, we ought to construe the 
concept of legitimacy broadly, as a claim to the forms of respect institutional actors need if they 
are to effectively contribute to coordinating actors in morally beneficial (or necessary) ways 
(Buchanan, 2013, pp. 175-88).  One intriguing implication of doing so is the possibility that the 
conditions an institution must satisfy to qualify as legitimate will vary depending on the type of 
activities it undertakes in pursuit of this end (Buchanan, 2013, pp. 188-93). 
 
Consent 
Though state consent continues to figure prominently in discussions of international 
law’s legitimacy, philosophers and legal theorists have long recognized its shortcomings as a 
basis for a general duty to obey existing international law (Buchanan, 2004; 2010; Buchanan and 
Keohane, 2006; Christiano, 2010; Pavel 2015, Lefkowitz, 2016b). The attractiveness of consent 
as a basis for legitimate rule lies in its alleged ability to reconcile a conception of agents as 
morally free and equal with their submission to authority.  An actor’s agreement to restrict his or 
her liberty has this consequence, however, only if it is undertaken voluntarily and intentionally.  
Yet the agreement of militarily and economically weak states to abide by the terms of various 
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international treaties may frequently fail to qualify as voluntary.  Likewise, legal agreements 
entered into by insufficiently representative governments cannot place their citizens under a 
moral obligation to conform to the terms of those agreements. Moreover, political officials 
sometimes refuse to consent to international agreements meant to protect the interests of the 
citizens whose country they claim to represent, or of individuals in other countries, thus 
undermining the legitimacy of rules that ought to have more general applicability, such as those 
that define international criminal liability for grave human rights violations for example.  This 
fact challenges the appropriateness of consent as the sole or even a necessary criterion for 
legitimacy.  
While the aforementioned considerations indicate the limits of consent as a basis for 
international law’s legitimacy, they do not exclude the possibility that some international legal 
actors currently have a consent-based moral obligation to obey some international legal norms 
(Lister 2011).  Furthermore, an argument demonstrating that state consent is not always a 
condition for international law’s legitimacy does not entail that it should never be.  Indeed, 
several theorists have recently argued that a fully legitimate international legal order must accord 
state consent a central place, since only by doing so can it reconcile a moral duty to obey specific 
international legal rules, or to support specific international institutions, with respect for the 
exercise of self-determination by democratic states (Christiano 2010; Besson 2016).   
 
Instrumental Justification 
Samantha Besson (2009) and John Tasioulas (2010) both draw on Joseph Raz’s service 
conception of authority to assess international law’s legitimacy (Raz 1986; 2006).  Roughly, 
states and other international legal subjects ought to defer to international law’s specification of 
their rights, duties, powers, and immunities if (a) they are more likely to conform to the moral 
reasons that apply to them by doing so than by acting on their own judgment, and (b) it is more 
important that they act rightly than that they choose what to do for themselves.  Where it serves 
to enhance international actors’ conformity to right reason, and where such conformity takes 
priority over the exercise of self-determination, international law enjoys legitimacy. 
One way international law provides this service is by correcting for ignorance or 
mistaken beliefs on the part of international actors.  Multi-lateral treaties, for example, likely 
take into account more information, and suffer from less bias, than would be true of a judgment 
reached by any party to the treaty on its own.  If so, then those parties will likely do better at 
acting as they have most (or undefeated) reason to act by adhering to the treaty than by acting on 
their own judgment.  International law may also provide a corrective to volitional defects.  For 
instance, by internalizing international legal norms governing the use of force, officials may be 
better able to resist the temptation to act in ways that benefit their state, or themselves, but that 
run contrary to the demands of justice.  Finally, given deep disagreement over the precise 
demands of justice, international actors will often do better at conforming to the moral reasons 
that apply to them by adhering to common rules regarding, e.g., the use of force, territorial 
claims, international migration, or trade than they will by acting on their own moral judgment.  
After all, what one state determines to be a just war, or a morally permissible restriction on 
imports, may frequently strike other states as aggression, or morally impermissible 
protectionism.  If states act on those judgments, the resulting conflicts will likely lead to even 
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graver injustices than those that will occur if all states conform to common rules governing war 
and trade, even if those rules deviate in certain respects from what justice truly requires.5 
   To our knowledge, no one who accepts the service conception of legitimate authority 
contests its application specifically to international law.  However, a fair number of legal 
philosophers argue that the service conception fails to offer a compelling account of any law’s 
legitimacy.  (For a helpful survey of critical responses, see Ehrenberg 2011).  One common 
objection, which may seem particularly pertinent to international law, concedes that the service 
conception may explain why state officials and other actors sometimes have good reason to 
comply with international law.  However, the service conception cannot explain why 
international law, or better, the international community whose law it is, has a right to rule 
correlative to which is a duty to obey on the part of international legal subjects (Buchanan 2010; 
Darwall 2010; Hershovitz 2011).  In response, defenders of the service conception argue that we 
should distinguish conceptually between the law’s claim to its subjects’ deference regarding their 
moral duties, and the agents entitled to the performance of those acts the law’s subjects have a 
moral duty to perform.  Suppose A has a moral right that B phi, and that B will do better at 
discharging this duty if she defers to C’s judgment regarding what constitutes phi-ing, when B 
ought to phi, and so on, then if she acts on her own judgment.  In this case, B’s duty to phi is 
owed to A, not to C, and it is A who has a justifiable complaint if B fails to defer to C when she 
ought to (because that is the best way for B to ensure that she discharges her moral duty to A).  If 
successful, this argument shows that it is a mistake to build into the very concept of legitimate 
practical authority the idea that the duty to obey is owed to the authority.  Thus it is not 
necessarily the case that, in order to establish the legitimacy of international law, we must 
explain why the international community has a claim-right to its subjects obedience, or put the 
other way around, why the subjects of international law owe the performance of their 
international legal obligations to the international community (Enoch 2014, pp. 323-28 ; 
Lefkowitz, 2016a, pp. 209-11).  
Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane also argue that the legitimacy of international law 
ought to be assessed instrumentally, in terms of the contribution it makes to facilitating mutually 
beneficial coordination among states and other actors grounded in “their common capacity to be 
moved by moral reasons” (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006, p. 409).  They then identify a set of 
substantive and procedural conditions global governance institutions must satisfy if they are to 
perform this task, which they label the Complex Standard of legitimacy.  The substantive 
conditions include not persistently violating the least controversial human rights, and not 
intentionally or knowingly engaging in conduct at odds with the global governance institutions’ 
purported aims and commitments.  The procedural standards include mechanisms for holding 
global governance institutions accountable for meeting the aforementioned substantive 
requirements, as well as mechanisms for contesting the terms of accountability.  To be effective, 
these mechanisms must be broadly transparent; e.g. information about how the institution works 
must be not only available but also accessible to both internal and external actors, such as 
inspectors general and non-governmental organizations.   
                                                     
5 Readers interested in exploring the perceived virtues and vices of employing the service 
conception to assess the legitimacy of international law may wish to investigate the recent debate 
over the proper relationship between the morality of war and the law of war.  Jeff McMahan 
(2008) and Adil Ahmad Haque (2017) both use the service conception to morally assess the law 
of war, while Seth Lazar (2012) and David Rodin (2011) argue against doing so. 
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Arguably, Buchanan and Keohane combine an account of the justification for global 
governance institutions – why such institutions may be morally desirable, and so why we may 
have pro tanto moral reasons not to interfere with their operation, and perhaps to actively support 
them – with an account of what makes global governance institutions legitimate (Simmons 1999; 
Lefkowitz 2016b).  If we ask why the actors over whom a global governance institution claims 
jurisdiction should treat its rules as presumptively binding simply in virtue of their having been 
issued by that institution, Buchanan and Keohane’s answer seems to the be same as the service 
conception’s, namely that those actors will do better at acting on the reasons that apply to them 
by deferring to the law than by acting on their own judgment (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006, p. 
436).  If so, then satisfying the Complex Standard is not what makes the rule of global 
governance institutions legitimate.  Rather, the fact that a global governance institution meets the 
Complex Standard provides evidence that its attempt to govern satisfies the service conception of 
legitimate authority, while it is the satisfaction of the service conception that makes that 
institution’s rule legitimate.  
 
Democracy 
Deference to law in circumstances characterized by reasonable moral disagreement 
regarding the terms on which people ought to interact with one another may also be justified 
non-instrumentally, on the grounds that it constitutes respect for others as moral equals.  Vis-à-
vis municipal or domestic law, arguments of this type typically require that the law be made 
democratically.  By extension, it might be thought that democracy also provides a necessary, or 
at least a sufficient, condition for the legitimacy of international law (Held 1995; Archibugi, 
2008). Yet Thomas Christiano, a defender of democracy as a necessary condition for the 
legitimacy of domestic law, argues against the moral desirability of a global democratic 
parliament (Christiano, 2010).  For example, he maintains that global democracy would likely 
generate persistent minorities, and that the mechanisms developed at the state level to address 
this problem would be less effective in a globe-spanning polity.  Partly, this is due to a second 
defect that would likely undermine the legitimacy of law made by a global democratic 
parliament, namely the absence of a robust global civil society, including institutions such as 
political parties that can mediate between individuals and officeholders.  Last but not least, 
Christiano argues that individuals and communities have unequal stakes in the activities that are 
most often identified as in need of global regulation, such as trade and many (though not all) 
types of environmental pollution.  A process for making law that gives all agents an equal say 
over matters in which they have very different stakes fails to advance the interests of all subjects 
in a publicly equal way.  Yet Christiano maintains that only law that does so enjoys legitimacy.   
David Held and Pietro Maffettone (2016) have recently offered qualified rebuttals to a 
number of these objections.  While many turn on empirical claims, the authors also point out that 
equality or inequality of stakes in the regulation of a given activity is not simply a natural fact 
but the product of an institutional choice that stands in need of a justification.  Therefore, it 
cannot be presumed to serve as an unproblematic premise in a moral argument against the 
pursuit of global democracy. 
 
SECTION III. International Law and State Sovereignty 
 
The question of whether international law institutions exercise legitimate authority over 
states is bound up with the concern that international law may unacceptably interfere with the 
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authority of sovereign states. This final question is motivated by an understanding of state 
sovereignty as a historical norm that protects the prerogatives of political communities to make 
their own rules independent of outside political or legal control. Sovereignty is thus primarily a 
right of states to govern themselves internally as they see fit. The skeptical challenge stems from 
the fact that international law is seen to unjustifiably restrict this right either by its very nature, or 
by the ways in which specific rules or decisions are made and imposed upon states by treaties 
and international organizations. 
Ideals of political sovereignty have come a long way from their absolutist origins in the 
thought of 16th and 17th century political thinkers such as Jean Bodin, Samuel Pufendorf, and 
Thomas Hobbes. For example, we no longer believe as Hobbes did that political power divided 
internally will lead to instability and a state of perpetual war (Hobbes 1994, 119, 214). In fact, 
modern liberal democracies hold internally divided government as a precondition of peace and 
the protection of citizens’ rights. But in relation to international law many continue to view the 
authority of states in absolute or quasi-absolute terms, and they reject any legitimate role for 
international law in shaping domestic politics.  
Realists have long been skeptical of the place of international law in an anarchic system 
of states. According to realist scholars, states behave according to an internal logic of anarchy 
which requires them to prioritize survival. States ought to maximize their military and economic 
capacity, even at the expense of other states, and in so far as international law gets in the way of 
states pursuing their goals of maximizing power, it should be ignored and delegitimized (Krasner 
2002, 267; Mearsheimer 1994, 12, 16, 48). ‘New realists’ such as Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. 
Posner echo these views of international law that see it as both ineffective and dangerous.  They 
make both a descriptive claim that international law does not have any effects on state behavior, 
and a normative claim that states do not have obligations to respect international law but rather 
obligations to serve the interest of their citizens, which ‘almost always produces a self-interested 
foreign policy’ (Goldsmith and Posner 2005, 14, 84-91, 100-106). State institutions are set up by 
political communities to protect the welfare of their members. States have no obligation to 
follow international law except when it is in their interest to do so (Goldsmith and Posner 2005, 
185–87). 
Criticism of the ‘new realists’ has been swift and powerful. Jens David Ohlin has argued 
for example that Goldsmith and Posner ignore the fact that states are planning agents, and in 
virtue of their long-term view of their interests, engage in strategic cooperative behavior, that is 
in creating and complying with international rules, as a way to further their plans. Long term 
plans give states reasons to continue to affirm the choice of rules that best advance those plans, 
and their interests, even in the face of opportunistic short-term gains in defection. One function 
that law can serve is to ensure that the long terms strategic interests of agents are protected and 
advanced, and international law is no exception in this regard (Ohlin 2014, 119–53; Spiro 2014, 
448–54). Thus, contrary to what Goldsmith and Posner argue, states better serve their interests 
and the interests of their citizens by strengthening and following international law rather than by 
engaging in short-term opportunistic gain. In fact, a proper understanding of states’ role as 
fiduciaries of their citizens makes the idea of states’ obligations to obey international law even 
more compelling, insofar as the latter contains powerful norms that protect human rights (Tesón 
1998; Criddle and Fox-Decent 2016). In this latter understanding, state sovereignty is not 
maintly or primarily a rigth, but a duty, and international law and institutions can legitimately 
restrict state sovereignty to the extent to which states fail to uphold their duties to their citizens. 
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Political philosophers have been mostly preoccupied with understanding and justifying 
the internal dimension of states sovereignty, that of citizens’ obedience to state institutions, and 
thus have paid little to no attention to external dimension of sovereignty, namely the question of 
how international law affects state sovereignty. Some political philosophers defend the primacy 
of states against cosmopolitan challenges in a way that could be read to support the realist 
rejection of international law. ‘Statist’ political philosophers argue that the state is the primary 
site of justice, and as a result, it owes primary allegiance to its citizens and the citizens to the 
state. In Liberal Loyalty, Anna Stilz portrays the state as the sine qua non of justice, without 
which individuals could not engage each other as moral equals and create institutions that protect 
their rights.  Therefore, their first allegiance should go to its institutions, at least if they are 
citizens of liberal-democratic states, since they best approximate liberal ideals of justice that 
place freedom and equality at their center (Stilz 2009, 22, 81–84). Liberal nationalists such as 
David Miller and Margaret Moore defend a more expansive notion of national allegiance that 
does not depend on national states being liberal democratic. States deserve moral allegiance 
because they are unique projects of collective self-creation through which groups of individuals 
convert a common past and cultural identity into shared institutions that express and solidify 
social bonds (Miller 1997, 10–11, 67–79; Moore 2001, 28–31). Against cosmopolitans, who 
claim that individuals owe equal regard to humanity as a whole rather than to specific political 
communities, statists and nationalists defend special allegiances to state institutions because it is 
through these institutions that compatriots or co-nationals commit reciprocally to each other’s 
wellbeing and to a joint, evolving conception of justice (Caney 2006, 25–62; Tan 2004, 40–61).   
Several readings are available of the statist or nationalist positions, only one of which is 
sympathetic to the realist project. The more extreme reading, is that allegiance to the (nation-) 
state must be exclusive in order for citizens to properly express the intrinsic moral value of state 
membership. Nothing short of exclusive devotion to state institutions is warranted to cement the 
bonds of reciprocity, fairness, and justice. This ‘incompatibilist worry’ takes multiple forms, and 
Allen Buchanana and Russell Powell identify several versions worth considering (2008, 327–
28). For incompatibilists, the value of constitutional democracy is ‘so obvious and 
overwhelming,” and the costs to self-determination so great and undeniable, that nothing short of 
the wholesale rejection of international law is called for (Buchanan and Powell 2008, 328). 
Although this reading is a logical extension of statist arguments, to our knowledge, none of the 
defenders of statism mentioned above are partial to it. In fact, most acknowledge the existence of 
obligations of justice beyond borders even as they defend the primacy of national ties. But it is 
still unclear whether their acceptance of moral obligations beyond borders translates into support 
for the authority of international law. This is because recognizing the authority of international 
law would require states and citizens to give primacy to some of its demands over the demands 
of their state institutions and laws, in other words to recognize that some concerns of global 
justice embodied in international law take priority. This is the position Carmen Pavel defends in 
her book Divided Sovereignty. In it she argues that international law can give a wide berth to 
states making their own rule but also use its authority to ensure that states fulfill their most basic 
sovereign responsibilities towards their own citizens. In fact, this understanding of the role of 
international law is consistent with the affirmation of the right to democratic self-governance, 
when citizens divide their allegiance between the institutions of their state and international 
institutions tasked with keeping the former in check (Pavel 2015, 33–44, 57–87). 
The more extreme reading may be endorsed implicitely and unreflectively by some 
realists, who discount even state consent as a vehicle through which states become bound by 
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international law. One could deny that international law raises a problem for state sovereignty as 
long as states consent to the international rules they are bound by. But realists deny the value of 
state consent: state consent to international treaties is either ‘cheap talk,’ or an irrational pathway 
of commitment inconsistent with self-preservation, given that state rationality is defined 
narrowly as protecting the interests of the citizens in state survival. Commitment to international 
law is irrational for the same reason that commitment to rules by individuals in a Hobbesian state 
of nature would be irrational: in makes states vulnerable to the unscrupulous defection of other 
states in the absence of general effective enforcement (Waltz 1979, 93, 107). But liberal 
institutionalists and constructivists have persuasively shown that realists draw unreasonably 
strong conclusions from the characterization of international politics as an anarchic system 
(Keohane 1984; Nye and Keohane 1971; Wendt 1992). States face cooperation and coordination 
dilemmas that are best addressed through stable, long term international cooperation in the form 
of treaties and organizations, which are necessary to state survival and to a whole host of other 
interests that states have beyond survival.  
The absence of a world government is treated as an explanatory variable by realists, but it 
is a cause for regret for political cosmopolitans, who argue that it is impossible for human beings 
to treat one another justly in the absence of a global state – e.g. because any international 
political order will necessarily expose some human beings to domination by others, or because 
some human beings will inevitably exercise morally inadequate input into the design of rules and 
institutions that shape their life prospects. These cosmopolitans are ultimately committed to the 
necessity of superseding an international legal order. States are obsolete political forms 
organized around parochial conceptions of justice, and they should give way to global 
institutions that define and implement a cosmopolitan conception of justice, according to which 
every human being is an object of equal moral concern regardless of their current political 
membership, cultural or religious identity, economic or social status. As a way to realize this 
ambitious vision, these theorists propose radical reforms to the existing institutional system in 
the form of a global democracy. International law, on this vision, would be the vehicle for the 
transition to a single, fully integrated world state which would realize the cosmopolitan ideal of 
justice (Marchetti 2008; Cabrera 2005; Tamir 2000; Gould 2004; Lu 2006). But moral 
cosmopolitanism, i.e. the view that we have some moral duties to all human beings as such, need 
not entail a commitment to political cosmopolitanism. In fact, plenty of theorists endorse gradual 
reform of the current state system through a process of constitutionalization or some other way to 
institutionalize a global structure that promotes and defends human rights without eliminating the 
existing plurality of legal orders (Cohen 2012; Benhabib 2011; Brock 2009).  
 
The question of whether international law interferes unacceptably with the authority of 
self-governing democratic communities to make their own rules depends in large part on the 
weight of sovereignty in our judgments about the legitimate prerogatives of states against 
interference. At one end seem to be those who believe that the boundaries of legitimate state 
authority should be in large part determined or even dissolved by international law. At the other 
end are those who believe those boundaries are a matter of purely internal exercises of 
democratic self-creation. These questions invite us to rethink the contours of state sovereignty 
and consequently some of the fundamental concepts and normative ideals in political philosophy, 
such as individual rights, democracy, political authority and political obligation. 
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